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ABSTRACT 
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This paper examines how unionization structures that differ in the degree of wage 
centralization affect firms' incentives to increase labor productivity. We distinguish 
three modes of unionization with increasing degree of centralization: (1) 
“Decentralization” where wages are determined independently at the firm-level, (2) 
“coordination” where an industry union sets individual wages for all firms at the firm-
level, and (3) “centralization” where a uniform wage rate is set for the entire industry. 
We show that firms' investment incentives are largest under complete centralization. 
However, investment incentives are non-monotone in the degree of centralization so 
that “decentralization” carries higher investment incentives than “coordination.” 
Depending on the innovation outcome, workers' wage bill is maximized under 
“centralization” if firms' productivity differences remain small. Otherwise, workers 
prefer an intermediate degree of centralization, which holds innovative activity down at 
its lowest level. Labor market policy can spur innovation by either decentralizing 
unionization structures or by imposing non-discrimination rules on monopoly unions. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Gewerkschaftssysteme und die Anreize der Unternehmen zur 
Produktivitätssteigerung 
Diese Arbeit untersucht den Einfluß unterschiedlicher Gewerkschaftssysteme auf die 
Anreize von Unternehmen, ihre Arbeitsproduktivität zu erhöhen. Wir unterscheiden 
zwischen drei Gewerkschaftsstrukturen mit zunehmendem Zentralisierungsgrad: 1.) 
„Dezentrale Lohnsetzung“, bei der Löhne ohne zentrale Koordination auf 
Unternehmensebene bestimmt werden, 2.) „koordinierte Lohnsetzung“, bei der eine 
Industriegewerkschaft die Lohnforderungen gegenüber einzelnen Arbeitgebern 
koordiniert und 3.) „zentralisierte Lohnsetzung“, bei der ein einheitlicher Lohnsatz für 
die gesamte Industrie bestimmt wird. Wir zeigen, daß die Investitionsanreize der 
Unternehmen bei „zentralisierter Lohnsetzung“ am stärksten sind. Die 
Investitionsanreize sind allerdings nicht monoton im Zentralisierungsgrad: 
„Dezentralisierte Lohnsetzung“ führt zu stärkeren Investitionsanreizen als „koordinierte 
Lohnsetzung“. Die Lohnsumme ist in einem zentralisierten Gewerkschaftssystem 
maximal, solange die Innovationen hinreichend „klein“ sind, so daß die Unterschiede in 
der Produktivität zwischen den Unternehmen gering bleiben. Bei „großen“ 
Innovationen bevorzugen Arbeitnehmer hingegen eine „koordinierte Lohnsetzung“, 
wodurch die Innovationstätigkeit der Unternehmen auf ihr niedrigstes Niveau gedrückt 
wird. Arbeitsmarktpolitik kann die Innovationsanreize entweder durch eine 
Dezentralisierung der Lohnsetzung oder durch Diskriminierungsverbote für 
Monopolgewerkschaften erhöhen. 
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1 Introduction
How unions aﬀect firms’ performance, innovation and labor productivity is a highly
controversial issue (for a survey see, e.g., Flanagan 1999). On the one hand, unions are
argued to hurt firms as unionization may increase wage demands and, thereby, firms’
labor costs (see, e.g., Oswald 1985, Farber 1986, or Hirsch 1991). On the other hand,
unions are regarded as part of a constructive labor market regime which smoothens
industrial relations, thereby promoting labor productivity and lowering average costs
(see Freeman and Medoﬀ 1984). In general though, it is not the mere existence of
unions that is decisive for firms’ performance, but rather the specific mode of labor
market organization (see Calmfors and Driﬃll 1988, Soskice 1990, and Layard et al.
1991).
Wage setting diﬀers substantially between countries.1 A salient dimension that dif-
ferentiates national unionization structures is the degree of wage-setting centralization
(see, e.g., Calmfors and Driﬃll 1988, Moene and Wallerstein 1997, Flanagan 1999, and
Wallerstein 1999).2 At the industry level, a decentralized wage setting structure is com-
monly contrasted with a completely centralized wage setting structure. While in the
former case, wages are set between a single employer and a firm-level union, in the latter
case an industry union negotiates a standard wage for the entire industry.
Among the diﬀerent modes of labor market organization, the more centralized labor
market institutions have come under attack in the policy debate over labor market orga-
nization and economic performance. A commonly held view is that wage rigidities that
do not account for local conditions are generally bad for overall economic performance
(see, for example, Nickell 1997 and Siebert 1997), so that any move towards more decen-
tralized, and hence, more flexible structures is good for the economy. Consistent with
this view, the OECD Jobs Study (OECD 1996, p. 15) recommends to “make wage and
labour costs more flexible by removing restrictions that prevent wages from reflecting
1As labor market organization diﬀers substantially between countries, regions, and industries, there
exists a large literature about the possible key characteristics which are crucial for the relative perfor-
mance of diﬀerent labor market organizations. For comparisons of countries’ labor market institutions
see, e.g., Nickell (1997), OECD (1997, chapter 3), Blau and Kahn (1999), and Wallerstein (1999).
2The notion of centralization has been used by Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) to argue that diﬀerences
in national unionization structures can explain macroeconomic performance. In their work the notion
of centralization refers to the degree to which coalitions are created across unions, firms or industries.
Accordingly, enterprise wage-setting between one firm and its respective union is the most decentralized
form of a (collective) wage agreement, while wage centralization increases the more firms a single union
can bring under a single wage-tariﬀ agreement where complete centralization is reached if the entire
economy falls under the collective wage agreement. In contrast to this approach, we will confine our
analysis to the industry level.
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local conditions (...).”
Given this policy recommendation, tendencies to introduce more flexibility into cen-
tralized wage systems have given rise to intermediate structures, where wage setting
remains highly coordinated at the industry level but where adjustments to local condi-
tions can be made at the firm-level as well. For example, in Germany collective wage
agreements between industry unions and employer associations have started to con-
tain so-called “opting out clauses” according to which firms are allowed to pay wages
below the collectively agreed rate if they face economic hardships.3 Moreover, even
wage-setting under the auspices of an industry union can allow for considerable wage
diﬀerentials between firms.4 Trends towards less centralized wage setting institutions
can also be observed in other countries as, e.g., Denmark, Sweden, Australia, or New
Zealand.5
Motivated by these tendencies towards more flexible wage setting regimes at the
industry level, this paper examines two related questions. Firstly, how do various union-
ization structures that diﬀer with respect to wage centralization aﬀect firms’ incentives
for implementing labor productivity enhancing technologies? And secondly, what are
the conditions under which workers prefer wage setting to be completely centralized,
and when do workers prefer more flexible wage setting regimes?
Most of the existing theoretical work on the relationship between unionization and in-
novative activity has focused on how a union’s bargaining power and its objectives aﬀect
firms’ investment for labor cost reduction. Following the seminal work by Grout (1984),
the conventional wisdom has been that a firm’s incentives are decreasing with union
bargaining power because of the union’s hold-up incentive to raise its wage demands
after investments are sunk. As this reduces the firm’s expected return on investment,
unionization will reduce investment incentives (see also Malcomson 1997). More recent
work by Tauman and Weiss (1987) and Ulph and Ulph (1994, 2001) has qualified this
underinvestment result by considering oligopolistic competition between firms in the
3See Sachverständigenrat (1998, pp. 117-127) where “wage flexibility clauses” of recent industry-wide
tariﬀ agreements in Germany are summarized. One example is the 1997 collective wage agreement for
the construction industry in eastern Germany, according to which companies may reduce the collectively
agreed wage by up to 10 percent.
4See Büttner and Fitzenberger (1998) for wage dispersion under industry-wide wage setting in Ger-
many.
5For a country-wise survey of recent trends towards more flexible wage setting system see, e.g.,
Katz (1993). For the Australian case see in particular Wailes and Lansbury (1999). The breakdown of
centralized wage bargaining in Denmark and Sweden is documented in Iverson (1996). The Swedish case
is also studied extensively in Hibbs and Locking (2000). For the period 1950-1992, a more conservative
view is expressed in Wallerstein et al. (1997).
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final goods market (for a survey see Ulph and Ulph 1998).6
This literature has focused exclusively on firm-level unionization, i.e., one polar case
where wages are set at the firm-level by independent unions. Hence, the relative per-
formance of more centralized wage setting systems remains an open issue, even though
the degree of wage centralization has been identified as a crucial feature of diﬀerent
unionization structures. Our focus is, therefore, on diﬀerent unionization structures and
how they aﬀect firms’ incentives to undertake labor productivity enhancing investments.
Moreover, we also analyze workers’ preferences for diﬀerent unionization structures.
More precisely, we introduce a unionized oligopoly model, where firms decide about
productivity enhancing investments in the first stage, labor unions determine wages in
the second stage, and finally, firms compete in Cournot fashion on the product mar-
ket. We compare three unionization structures with “decentralized,” “coordinated,”
and “centralized” wage setting. Under the decentralized structure wages are determined
at the firm-level without coordination among unions. In contrast, under centralization
an industry-union sets one uniform wage tariﬀ for all firms across the entire industry.
Centralization at an intermediate level implies industry-wide coordination on the union’s
side, but at the same time it allows for adjustments at the firm-level. As we will show
the (interfirm) wage diﬀerentials can be ordered according to the degree of centraliza-
tion. Wage dispersion is completely compressed under centralized wage setting while it is
largest under a decentralized wage structure. At the intermediate level of centralization
the wage diﬀerential lies in between those polar cases.
Concerning firms’ investment incentives, we show that a uniform wage rule acts as an
insurance device that protects firms’ investments against opportunistic wage demands.
The intuition for this result can be gained by contrasting centralized wage setting with
the intermediate case where firm-level unions coordinate in setting a diﬀerentiated wage
profile. Suppose that initially two firms are in the industry and that both firms are sym-
metric. If now one firm increases its labor productivity, industry wage-bill maximization
implies a diﬀerentiated wage profile, where the more eﬃcient firm pays a higher wage
than the less eﬃcient firm. Consequently, an “equal pay for equal work policy” con-
strains the union’s wage demand, as any wage increase is now also imposed on the less
productive firm. As a result, an innovative firm can appropriate more of the rent when
wage setting is centralized.
6For example, Tauman and Weiss (1987) consider a duopoly where only one firm is unionized. As
the unionized firm faces a higher wage level it also can have larger incentives to invest. In Ulph and
Ulph (2001) union strength can increase a firm’s innovative eﬀort under eﬃcient bargaining, if the union
cares a lot about employment (and not so much about wages). With Cournot competition in the final
good market an increase in the firm’s productivity will then mainly cause the rival firm to cut back its
output level which increases the unionized firm’s profits, and hence, its innovation incentives.
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In contrast, decentralized structures allow for firm-specific wage adjustments that
give rise to diﬀerentiated wage-profiles which increase the union’s scope for appropriating
some of the rent from the firms’ specific investments. As a consequence, we show that
firms undertake more costly investments if wage-setting is completely centralized. Hence,
labor productivity is higher under complete centralization than under more decentralized
unionization structures.
Next we show that workers can be better oﬀ adopting a centralized unionization
structure, as this increases firms’ investment incentives which in turn can boost wage
revenues. However, if technological progress results in very asymmetric outcomes where
successful innovators obtain a large competitive advantage over their rivals, workers tend
to prefer coordinated wage setting with wage flexibility at the firm-level.
We also compare investment incentives under unionized labor markets with a per-
fectly competitive labor market. A centralized unionization structure can either lead
to stronger or weaker investment incentives than a perfectly competitive labor market,
depending on workers’ reservation wage. In contrast, if wages are flexible at the firm
level, investment incentives are always lower compared to perfectly competitive labor
markets. Finally, we discuss policy issues that accrue from recent trends towards more
flexible tariﬀ settlements, as provided by so-called “opting out clauses”.
While our paper contributes to the theory of innovation in unionized oligopolies,
the dynamic eﬃciency eﬀects of non-discriminatory pricing rules for monopolistically
supplied inputs on downstream firms’ investment incentives have been analyzed, for
example, in DeGraba (1990). However, as this literature focuses on the normative issue
of monopolistic input supplier regulation, it neither deals with decentralized supply
structures nor does it provide a positive analysis of the stability of diﬀerent supply
structures.
Finally, our work is related to arguments which have been put forward in the Swedish
debate over “solidaristic” bargaining (see Rehn 1952) that have been recently formal-
ized in Agell and Lommerud (1993) and Moene and Wallerstein (1997). According to
this literature, nation-wide wage settlements that are associated with a high degree of
wage equality drive out ineﬃcient firms, expedite structural change, and thereby, foster
growth. In contrast, our analysis focuses on the role of diﬀerent unionization structures
to overcome the hold-up problem associated with unionization in oligopolistic industries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model’s
structure and define diﬀerent unionization structures. We solve the model for the static
case where firms’ productivity levels are given in Section 3. Section 4 solves for firms’ in-
vestment incentives and analyzes workers’ preferred unionization structure and compares
our results to investment incentives with perfectly competitive labor markets. In Section
4
5 we discuss implications for labor market policy, and finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model and Unionization Structures
Consider a homogeneous goods Cournot duopoly, where firms are indexed by i = 1, 2.
Both firms operate under constant returns to scale, with labor being the only factor of
production. To produce a unit of the final good, firm i requires 1/αi units of a single
input of homogeneous labor, where αi is firm i’s input-output coeﬃcient. Denoting
wages at firm i by wi, firm i’s marginal cost is then given by αiwi. Let qi denote the
quantity of the final good produced by firm i, and let xi be its labor demand. Since firm
i requires αi units of labor per unit of output, we have xi = qiαi. We assume a linear
inverse demand function of the standard form p = A− q1 − q2.
Initially, i.e., before any cost-reducing investment is undertaken, both firms have
the same labor productivity, α1 = α2, which we normalize to unity. However, firm 1
has the opportunity to undertake a labor-saving investment project which decreases its
labor requirement per unit of output by ∆, with 0 < ∆ < α1.7 We denote a labor-
saving investment project by I(∆), where I is the cost for increasing labor productivity
from 1/α1 to 1/(α1 −∆). We suppose that the investment increases labor productivity
instantaneously and is perfectly protected against imitation. As I is the amount that has
to be sunk in order to implement a productivity enhancing technology, it also measures
how severe the hold-up problem is that firm 1 faces under unionization. If an investment
project does not involve any specific investment, then I is zero and, accordingly, the hold-
up problem vanishes. Conversely, as I becomes larger the hold-up problem becomes
more severe, and labor market organization becomes a critical determinant of firms’
investment incentives.
The opportunity cost of labor, given through the workers’ outside option such as
their alternative income, is denoted by w0, with 0 < w0 < A. It is assumed that the
union maximizes its members’ wage bill relative to the opportunity cost of labor, and
we adopt the right-to-manage assumption: The union(s) can set the wage while each
firm retains the right to choose its employment level.8
7Our assumption that only one firm has the opportunity to undertake cost-reducing investment
follows Bester and Petrakis (1993). It is also consistent with the patent tournament model of Ulph and
Ulph (1998) where only one firm ends up as the exclusive patent right holder.
8In contrast to the right-to-manage assumption eﬃcient bargaining models assume that unions and
firms bargain over both wages and firms’ employment levels (Oswald and Turnbull 1985, Layard et
al. 1991, and Booth 1995). While it is true that unions rarely set wages unilaterally nor do they
only care about wages, these simplifying assumption allow us to extract unions’ incentives to exercise
self-restraints as in the form of the “equal pay for equal work” commitment.
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We consider a three stage game with the following timing: In the first stage, firm 1
decides whether or not to undertake a given investment project, I(∆), that reduces firm
1’s input-output-ratio by ∆ at a cost of I. In the second stage, wages are determined,
where we distinguish the three unionization structures ρ = D,C,U with the following
properties:
1. Decentralization (ρ = D): There are two firm-level unions which set firm-level
wages w1 and w2 for their firms on behalf of the respective firm’s employees. The
two unions choose their wage demands simultaneously and noncooperatively.
2. Coordination (ρ = C): An industry union coordinates the wage demands w1 and
w2 so as to maximize the industry wage bill.
3. Centralization (ρ = U): There is one industry-wide union which sets a uniform
industry wage w for both firms so as to maximize the industry wage bill.
Finally, in the third stage of the game the two firms compete in quantities, taking
productivity levels and wage rates as given.
This timing of the game is intended to reflect the planning horizon usually associated
with the respective decisions. Investment decisions are mostly long-run while wage
contracts are usually negotiated for a much shorter time horizon, and product market
quantities can usually be adjusted on an even shorter basis.
The three unionization structures diﬀer with respect to the degree of centralization
in the following way: The D-regime can be viewed as the most decentralized system of
collective wage setting, where firm-level unions do not cooperate and set firm-specific
wages depending on the relative eﬃciency of their employer. In contrast, the U-regime
stands for the most centralized wage setting system, as labor supply is perfectly monop-
olized and the industry union determines one uniform wage for all firms in the industry.9
The C-regime lies in between those polar cases. On the one hand labor supply is com-
pletely monopolized, as an industry union coordinates wage demands at the firm level.
On the other hand firm-level wages are adjustable to the firms’ relative competitiveness.
Consequently, diﬀerent wages are likely to prevail in this case.10
At this point two remarks are at hand: Firstly, our notion of centralization requires
either an industry union or intense coordination among firm-level unions. Secondly, the
diﬀerent labor market regimes also diﬀer in terms of (inter-firm) wage flexibility. While
9This regime embodies the famous union-slogan “Equal pay for equal work.”
10The C-regime stands for recent trends in continental Europe, where monopoly unions bargain over
industry wage profiles that allow for more flexibility at the firm-level and for opting-out clauses for less
eﬃcient firms that are otherwise bound to the tariﬀ-agreement (for recent trends see also OECD 1997).
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neither regime D nor C imposes any restriction on wage flexibility the uniform wage
setting regime U completely depresses any wage diﬀerential between firms. Hence, we
portray centralization as a multidimensional concept.
Before we compare the diﬀerent regimes, let us introduce the following assumption
in order to exclude corner solutions in which the non-innovating firm is driven out of
the market.11
Assumption 1. The investment projects under consideration lead to non-drastic
productivity improvements in the sense that the union prefers the less eﬃcient firm to
remain active in the market even under the centralized wage-setting regime U; i.e.,
w0 < w0(∆) ≡
(1− 3∆)A
1−∆2 , (1)
which implies that we restrict attention to productivity increases ∆ < 1/3.
Assumption 1 ensures that all optimization problems in the second and third stage
of the game stay globally concave. We maintain Assumption 1 throughout the rest of
the paper.
3 The Static Case: Given Productivity Levels
Let us begin our analysis by solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium quantities and
wages, taking firms’ productivity levels as given. Firm 1’s profit function is
Π1 = (A− q1 − q2)q1 − w1(1−∆)q1,
and firm 2’s profits are given by
Π2 = (A− q1 − q2)q2 − w2q2.
For given wages w1 and w2, the firms’ subgame perfect strategies are
q1(w1, w2,∆) =
A− 2w1(1−∆) + w2
3
, (2)
q2(w1, w2,∆) =
A− 2w2 + w1(1−∆)
3
. (3)
Now turn to the wage-setting stage. Wage-bill maximization implies that the union’s
optimal wage setting strategy, wρi , regarding firm i is defined as
wρi = argmax
wi≥0
Uρi (wi, w
ρ
j ) for i = 1, 2, i 6= j,
11Assumption 1 is derived in the Appendix. Similar restrictions are also employed in Bester and
Petrakis (1993) and Ulph and Ulph (1994, 1998, 2001).
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for regimes ρ = U,C,D where UDi = xi(wi − w0), UCi =
P2
i=1 xi(wi − w0), and UUi =P2
i=1 xi(w − w0) for the respective regimes, where labor demands xi are derived from
equations (2) and (3). Lemma 1 and 2 summarize our results concerning equilibrium
wages and quantities.
Lemma 1. For the diﬀerent unionization structures the equilibrium wages are as
follows:
(i) Decentralization (D): wD1 =
5A+2w0(5−4∆)
15(1−∆) and w
D
2 =
5A+2w0(5−∆)
15
.
(ii) Coordination (C): wC1 =
A+w0(1−∆)
2(1−∆) and w
C
2 =
A+w0
2
.
(iii) Centralization (U): wU = (2−∆)A+2w0(1−∆+∆
2)
4(1−∆+∆2) for i = 1, 2.
Substitution of the equilibrium wages into equations (2) and (3) gives the firms’
equilibrium output levels.
Lemma 2. Under the diﬀerent unionization structures ρ = D,C,U the equilibrium
production quantities for firm 1 and 2 are as follows:
qD1 = 2 (5A− w0(5− 7∆)) /45 and qD2 = 2 (5A− w0(5 + 2∆)) /45,
qC1 = (A− w0(1− 2∆)/6 and qC2 = (A− w0(1 +∆)/6,
qU1 = q
C
1 +
A∆
4(1−∆+∆2) and q
U
2 = q
C
2 −
A∆(1−∆)
4(1−∆+∆2) .
Using the results of Lemma 1 and comparing equilibrium wages and the inter-firm
wage diﬀerential, dρw ≡ w
ρ
1−w
ρ
2, across the three diﬀerent regimes, we obtain the following
ordering:
Corollary 1. For all ∆ > 0, the ordering of the wages w1 and w2 and the wage
diﬀerential, dρw ≡ w
ρ
1 − w
ρ
2, under the diﬀerent unionization structures is as follows:
(i) Firm 1’s wages: wC1 > w
U > wD1 .
(ii) Firm 2’s wages: wU > wC2 > w
D
2 .
(iii) Wage diﬀerentials: dDw > d
C
w > d
U
w(= 0).
Corollary 1 shows how wage-setting depends on the particular mode of unionization.
Decentralized wage-setting leads to the lowest wage levels compared to more central-
ized structures. Under coordinated wage-setting without a uniformity rule (ρ = C) a
positive wage-diﬀerential results where the eﬃcient firm pays the highest wage. How-
ever, the wage-diﬀerential under regime C is lower than under system D. The ordering
of the wage diﬀerentials mirrors our notion of wage-setting centralization as discussed
above. Wage-setting under the completely decentralized regime D is most responsive to
firms’ characteristics, so that productivity diﬀerences between firms translate into the
largest wage diﬀerentials. On the other side of the spectrum, centralized wage setting
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under regime U depresses any heterogeneity in the wage-setting process so that wage
diﬀerentials vanish.12
The ordering of wage diﬀerentials under the unionization structures mirrors the em-
pirical finding that wage dispersion is negatively correlated with wage centralization,
which is documented in OECD (1997), Flanagan (1999), and Wallerstein (1999). Inter-
estingly, even though the intermediate regime C and the decentralized regime D both
allow for full flexibility at the firm-level, the wage profile is more compressed under
regime C than under D. This is because under decentralized wage setting the high-cost
firm’s union is willing to accept a lower wage in order to restall its firm’s competitiveness
on the product market. In contrast, an industry union fully internalizes the negative
“business stealing” externality of this policy. Hence, under a coordinated wage setting
regime (C) the union’s incentive to adjust firm 2’s wage to a lower level in response to
an increase in firm 1’s productivity is much weaker.13
From Corollary 1, we can also gain further insights how the severity of the hold-up
problem that firm 1 faces varies under the three unionization structures. Noting that
Πi = q
2
i must hold in equilibrium and using equation (2), we can also write firm 1’s
profits as
Π1 =
1
9
(A− w1(1− 2∆)− dw)2 . (4)
This expression of firm 1’s profits allows us to identify two diﬀerent hold-up eﬀects.
Firstly, firm 1’s profits are being reduced as the wage level, w1, increases, and secondly,
profits decrease as the wage diﬀerential between the two firms widens. Hence, there are
two kinds of hold-up:
1. Wage-level hold-up: An increase in firm 1’s wage level - while holding the wage dif-
ferential constant - unambiguously reduces the gains from innovation;
∂Π1/∂w1 < 0.
2. Wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up: An increase in the wage diﬀerential - while holding
the wage level constant - unambiguously reduces the gains from innovation; i.e.
∂Π1/∂dw < 0.
While the first kind of hold-up has received some attention in the respective literature,
the second way of rent extraction seems to be much less recognized. From Corollary 1
12It should be noted that centralized wage agreements often establish wage floors where firms may
decide to pay higher wages. This may be explained by eﬃciency wage considerations or other frictions
in labor market contracting that are beyond the scope of this paper.
13From Lemma 1 it follows that ∂wD2 /∂∆ < ∂wC2 /∂∆.
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we see that the wage-level hold-up is largest under the C regime and lowest under
the D regime. This ordering may suggest that decentralized wage-setting is the mode
of labor market organization that is most conducive to innovation. However, as part
(iii) of Corollary 1 reveals, decentralized wage-setting also involves the largest hold-up
potential via wage-diﬀerentiation. This may counter the positive eﬀects of lower wage
levels on incentives to invest.
Comparison of regimes C and U shows that both the wage level and the wage diﬀer-
ential are strictly lower under regime U than under C. Hence, the uniformity rule under
centralized wage setting restricts the union’s hold-up potential and, therefore, induces
larger investment incentives. Comparison with the decentralized wage-setting regime,
however, remains ambiguous so far. While under regime D the wage level is the lowest,
it also involves the largest scope for hold-up by wage diﬀerentiation.
Before turning to firms’ investment decisions, let us ask which unionization structure
workers prefer in the short run, i.e. in the absence of innovation. Unsurprisingly, workers
prefer an unconstrained monopoly union over both a constrained monopoly union (U) or
a fragmented unionization structure (D) since under regime C the unconstrained wage
bill maximum can be implemented. We can, therefore, state the following result:
Proposition 1. In the short run (where firms’ productivity levels are given), the
wage bill is maximized under regime C if ∆ > 0.
As will become clear in the next section, workers’ preferences are likely to change
when firms’ investment incentives are taken into account.
4 The Dynamic Case: Productivity Improvements
4.1 Investment Incentives
Incentives to invest depend on how innovation aﬀects firms’ profits. Hence, we need
to analyze how firm 1’s profits change with a productivity enhancing investment under
diﬀerent modes of labor market organization.
The increase in firm 1’s profit gives us the maximum expenditure on productivity
enhancing investment that it is willing to undertake. Let us define Iρ ≡ Πρ1(∆)−Π
ρ
1(0),
with ρ = D,C,U , where Π1(∆) is firm 1’s equilibrium profit if a given investment
project I(∆) is undertaken, and Π1(0) stands for firm 1’s equilibrium profit if it does
not carry out the investment project.14,15 The following proposition states the main
14In the following the argument “∆” describes the investment case and the argument “0” stands for
the no-investment case.
15Note that comparing only the marginal incentives to invest (i.e. comparing ∂Πρ/∂∆ for ρ = D,C,U)
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result regarding firm 1’s investment incentives:
Proposition 2. Innovation incentives are largest under unionization structure U
and smallest under unionization structure C; i.e. IU > ID > IC.
Proof. See Appendix.
Before commenting on Proposition 2, let us shortly digress to the literature on patent
tournaments under unionization in order to link our results more closely to the existing
literature (most importantly, to Ulph and Ulph 1998). In a patent tournament firm i
is granted a license for a new technology if firm j does not purchase it. In this case,
the competitive threat faced by firm 1 is diﬀerent, as firm 2 will have the competitive
advantage should firm 1 decide not to purchase the patent. Hence, firm 1’s reservation
price for obtaining the patent, P ρ, is given by the diﬀerence in profits between the
eﬃcient and the ineﬃcient firm; i.e. P ρ ≡ Πρ1(∆) − Π
ρ
1(−∆), where Π
ρ
1(∆) stands for
firm 1’s equilibrium profits if it obtains the exclusive right to use the patented technology.
Accordingly, Πρ1(−∆) is firm 1’s profit if the rival firm 2 receives the patent. Comparison
of the diﬀerent regimes shows that the ordering obtained in Proposition 2 is preserved
in a patent tournament.
Proposition 3. The firms’ reservation prices for the patented innovation are largest
under unionization structure U and smallest under structure C; i.e. PU > PD > PC.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition (2) and (3) show that diﬀerent unionization structures have diﬀerent
eﬀects on investment incentives. Our ordering of unionization structures along the di-
mension of wage centralization shows that a completely centralized wage-setting system
carries the largest investment incentives. Furthermore, the relationship between wage
centralization and innovative activity is non-monotone. Investment incentives are low-
est when centralization is intermediate; i.e. if an industry union can diﬀerentiate wage
demands across firms. This means that while the wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up is less
severe under intermediate centralization than under decentralization (as the wage struc-
ture is more compressed), the magnitude of the wage-level hold-up under intermediate
centralization outweighs this. Hence, the hold-up is larger in total under intermedi-
ate centralization, so that intermediate centralization has the most negative eﬀects on
investment incentives among the three regimes.
The first finding has important implications for empirical work on the relationship
between unionization and productivity or innovation.16 While much of the existing work
would be misleading since firm 1’s reduced profit function is not concave in ∆.
16Starting with the seminal work of Brown and Medoﬀ (1978) there is a large body of empirical
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focuses on union coverage and union density as measures of unionization, our results
indicate that wage centralization can also significantly aﬀect firms’ innovative behavior.
Our second finding, namely that investment incentives are non-monotone with re-
spect to centralization, calls for a critical reassessment of recent trends towards more
flexibility in industry-wide wage settlements. As those agreements often remain highly
coordinated on the union’s side our results indicate that flexibility can also adversely
aﬀect innovation incentives while the desired positive eﬀects on employment may re-
main small or even negligible as long as labor supply remains monopolized. Before we
elaborate on this issue in Section 5, let us first analyze which regime workers actually
prefer.
4.2 Workers’ Preferred Unionization Structure
Given that investment incentives are strongest under the least flexible wage setting
regime (U), the question arises which unionization structure would arise endogenously
if workers could decide which one to adopt. As demonstrated in the next proposition,
while coordinated wage setting can also be optimal, dynamic considerations may lead
workers to prefer a uniform wage setting regime.
Proposition 4. In the long run, the wage-bill maximizing unionization structure
depends on I(∆), with ∆ > 0, as follows:
(i) If I(∆) is undertaken under all regimes ( I(∆) < IC), then workers prefer regime
C.
(ii) For IC < I(∆) < IU there exists a threshold value e∆(w0) such that the wage bill
is maximized under regime U if ∆ > e∆(w0) and under regime C if ∆ < e∆(w0). The
threshold value e∆(w0) is increasing in w0.
(iii) If the investment project is not undertaken under any regime, i.e., IU < I(∆),
then workers are indiﬀerent between regimes C and U.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that workers may prefer a completely centralized unionization
structure (U) in order to provide a credible commitment against opportunistic wage
adjustments, thereby inducing investment that would not have occurred otherwise. If,
literature studying the eﬀects of unionization on productivity and innovation (see, e.g., Freeman and
Medoﬀ 1984, Connolly et al. 1986, Addison and Hirsch 1989, Hirsch 1991, Bronas and Deere 1993,
Addison and Wagner 1994). For a recent survey see Menezes-Filho et al. (1998). All in all the
empirical results are mixed; there is no unambiguous relation between union power (measured by union
density or union coverage) and productivity enhancing activities.
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however, the relevant investment projects lead to large asymmetries between firms, work-
ers will prefer the same regime ex ante as ex post, namely coordinated wage setting (C).
Hence, our model may also help to explain why trends may emerge away from highly
centralized unionization structures towards more flexible wage setting regimes: As firms’
innovative activities lead to “more asymmetric” outcomes, unions are more inclined to
allow for firm-level adjustments in wage formation. While it seems to be a widely held
belief that declining union density and increasing management or shareholder power
are the driving forces behind the erosion of centralized systems, Proposition 4 identifies
reasonable conditions under which unions themselves will support those tendencies.17
In particular, when innovations become more drastic so that market outcomes become
more asymmetric, unions are more likely to refrain from uniformity commitments.
4.3 Comparison with Perfectly Competitive Labor Markets
Since in policy debates over labor market reform it is often argued that policy makers
should take a more active role in introducing more labor market flexibility, it is useful
to relate our results to the benchmark case of perfectly competitive labor markets where
unionization is completely suppressed. Comparing our three regimes to a perfectly
competitive labor market (under a product market duopoly) yields the following result:
Proposition 5. Investment incentives are strictly larger under a perfectly competi-
tive labor market (ρ = ∗) than under coordinated (ρ = C) or decentralized wage-setting
(ρ = D). However, investment incentives are larger under centralized wage setting
(ρ = U) than under perfectly competitive labor markets (ρ = ∗) if w0 < A/4. For all
A/4 < w0 < A there exists a threshold value ∆∗ such that I∗ > IU if ∆ < ∆∗ and
I∗ < IU if ∆ > ∆∗. Moreover, ∆∗ is monotonically increasing in w0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that unionization can in fact carry larger investments incentives
than perfectly competitive labor markets. This, however, is only the case for completely
centralized wage setting where the risk of a hold-up through wage diﬀerentiation is
completely eliminated. As unionization leads to a wage rate above the competitive
wage, firms face a more elastic demand for their products, which can induce higher
investment activity under unionization. If, however, the reservation wage is suﬃciently
large, this eﬀect vanishes and a perfectly competitive market is likely to exhibit larger
17See also Katz (1993) who reports that unions have frequently supported moves towards decentral-
ization. A related point has been made by Lindbeck and Snower (2001) who show that recent trends
towards more flexible production techniques correspond with an increasing resistence against centralized
bargaining structures.
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investment incentives, as the wage level hold-up reduces firms’ investment incentives
under unionization. As Proposition 5 also states slightly more flexible wage-setting
institutions result in strictly lower investment incentives compared to the benchmark
case.
5 Labor Market Policy Implications
What are the implications our model has for labor market policy? At the latest since
Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) the question of the optimal degree of wage-setting centraliza-
tion has been most contentious and subject to a vigorous debate. The central questions
are how the labor market organization aﬀects unemployment on the one hand and pro-
ductivity on the other, and relatedly, whether a change in labor market policy can induce
more favorable outcomes. While quite a number of economists argue that labor market
rigidities and centralized wage-setting institutions are at the root of the unemployment
problem and also responsible for the poor economic performance of many European
countries (see, e.g., Siebert 1997), others point at the positive dynamic eﬃciency eﬀects
as firms have stronger incentives to increase their labor productivity when labor mar-
kets are less flexible (see, e.g., Kleinknecht 1998). While the first line of reasoning is
regularly put forward by economic experts such as the council of economic advisers in
Germany (see, e.g., Sachverständigenrat 1998, 117-127), union representatives usually
concur with the second argument and claim that wage diﬀerentiation opens the win-
dow for wage dumping (Schmutzkonkurrenz), which reduces firms’ incentives to increase
their labor productivity (see, e.g., Flassbeck and Scheremet 1995 or Soltwedel 1997).
Similar arguments have also been put forward in the Swedish debate over “solidaristic”
bargaining (see Rehn 1952).
As we have demonstrated in our model, there may be some truth in both lines of
reasoning, depending on the severity of the hold-up problem, the nature of innovation,
and other factors as workers’ reservation wage. Therefore, and since policy makers
usually care about both employment eﬀects and investment/productivity, it is useful to
summarize our results for policy purposes as follows:18
Remark 1. Depending on I(∆) we obtain the following results:
(i) For ID < I(∆) < IU coordinated wage setting under a uniformity rule (U)
provides the largest investment incentives but results in lower employment than regime
D.
18Using the results of Lemma 2 it is easily established that employment (i.e., q1(1−∆)+q2) is largest
under regime D. As Assumption 1 holds, this is also true if an investment project is not undertaken
under D but under U.
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(ii) Otherwise, decentralized wage setting maximizes employment while not aﬀecting
investment.
In light of Remark 1, an extension of antitrust rules to labor markets, as called for by
some economists (see, e.g., Baird 2000 and Haucap et al. 2001), may not be unwarranted.
A strict application of antitrust rules would mean that the formation of industry-wide
unions and collective wage agreements were not allowed due to their monopolization
eﬀects. While such a prohibition may imply lower productivity, our model predicts that
employment would increase. If, however, the creation of monopoly unions is allowed
for some reason, another antitrust rule may come into force, namely non-discrimination
rules. The requirement not to discriminate between firms would increase investment
incentives without lowering employment in our model.
In summary, policy makers may face a trade-oﬀ between more employment and higher
productivity in case (i) of Remark 1. Interestingly though, allowing for an industry union
and wage flexibility at the firm-level is never optimal for policy makers who care about
both employment and productivity. Hence, in the light of our model labor market
policy may be well advised either to restrict union formation altogether or to impose
non-discrimination rules on collective wage agreements. Based on these accounts, we are
left with the uncomfortable finding that labor markets are nevertheless exempted from
antitrust law.19
Even if the application of antitrust laws to labor markets is not a politically viable
option, our model casts severe doubts on the merits that slightly more flexible wage
institutions, which allow for diﬀerentiated wage profiles (e.g., through opting out clauses)
may have in highly centralized labor markets. In the light of our model, introducing
intermediate levels of centralization appear to be the worst policy option available, not
only on an economy-wide basis as stated by Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988), but also on an
industry-wide level.
6 Conclusion
As we have shown in this paper, firms’ incentives to invest in productivity enhancing
technology are non—monotone in the degree of wage-setting centralization at the in-
19For the European Union and, e.g., Germany there is no dispute that the labor market is completely
exempted from antitrust regulations (see, e.g., Rittner 1999). While in the United States the Penning-
tion case has proved that antitrust laws can be imposed on agreements beween unions and employers,
the overall picture is similar as in Europe (for an assessment of the US situation see, e.g., Sullivan and
Grimes 2000, pp. 716-727).
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dustry level.20 If coordinated wage-setting is combined with strict uniform wage rules
investment incentives are largest, while coordinated wage setting alone performs worst
in terms of innovative activity. Our results, therefore, suggest to distinguish coordinated
wage regimes along the lines of wage flexibility. For this purpose, it should prove useful
that the degree of centralization is monotone in the interfirm wage diﬀerential, which
suggests that it should be used as an explanatory variable in a reduced form approach.
While it is conventional wisdom that rigidities in European labor markets are the
main cause for the high unemployment in Europe, we would also point to the commit-
ment value that these rigidities provide, as they help to reduce the hold-up problem
associated with unionism. Since the conventional arguments for labor market dereg-
ulation are based on a static framework without innovation, they fail to capture the
commitment aspects associated with diﬀerent forms of labor market organization. In
contrast, our paper has analyzed the strategic incentives to innovate under diﬀerent
modes of labor market organization and we argued that “equal pay for equal work”
rules may be beneficial as they can encourage innovation. In this case, policy makers
face a trade-oﬀ between high employment and productivity when designing labor market
regulations and labor market policy more generally.
While we do not wish to over-emphasize this point, we believe that understanding
the institutional complementarities of labor market organization and innovation is cru-
cial for discussing the eﬀects of labor market deregulation. The costs and benefits of
labor market regulation are likely to be less clear-cut than is sometimes argued (see, for
example, Siebert, 1997). While decentralization leads to higher employment levels in
our framework, it also reduces innovation incentives. In contrast, a highly inflexible and
centralized regime carries the highest innovation systems, but leads to lower employment
than a decentralized regime. An intermediate degree of centralization with only some
(in)flexibility appears to be especially undesirable in the light of our analysis.
For our model, we have used the simplifying assumption that firms are initially
symmetric. If, however, we assume instead that firms are already asymmetric when
they decide about any investment, the natural question arises how wage-setting systems
aﬀect the evolution of oligopoly markets. While we have to leave a definite answer to
further research, we conjecture that centralized wage-setting under a uniformity rule is
likely to increase asymmetries between firms, while a decentralized system may give rise
to oﬀsetting eﬀects. Other areas for further research may be to fully endogenize the
20The empirical literature is generally not conclusive on the relationship between various measures of
labor market rigidity and economic growth. The OECD, for example, recently concluded: “While higher
unionization and more co-ordinated bargaining lead to less earnings inequality, it is more diﬃcult to
find consistent and clear relationships between those key characterictics of collective bargaining systems
and aggregate employment, unemployment, or economic growth” (OECD 1996, p. 2).
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choice of labor market institutions and to analyze investment incentives under diﬀerent
degrees of centralization and diﬀerent bargaining patterns or union preferences.
Appendix
Derivation of Condition (1) in Assumption 1.
We first derive condition (1), which is a suﬃcient condition that ensures that all firms
produce strictly positive output levels. Then we show that Assumption 1 guarantees
interior equilibrium outcomes such that the less eﬃcient firm 2 has a strictly positive
production quantity under all three unionization structures.
Assume that we face regime U, and, for the moment, also suppose that firm 2 is
not active. Then, firm 1’s optimal choice in the third stage is given by q1(w,∆) =
[A − w(1−∆)]/2. Accordingly, the union sets w to maximize U = (1 −∆)q1(w − w0)
which yields the optimal wage w(∆) = [A + w0(1 − ∆)]/[2(1 − ∆)]. This, however,
cannot constitute an equilibrium outcome as long as firm 2’s labor demand remains
strictly positive. Firm 2’s best response function in the third stage of the game is given
by q2(q1, w) = max{A− q1−w)/2, 0}, and by substituting q1(w,∆) and w(∆) we obtain
that q2(q1, w) > 0 if condition (1) holds. Hence, condition (1) is suﬃcient to exclude
corner solutions under regime U where only the eﬃcient firm stays in the market.
We next show that condition (1) guarantees interior solutions under all three union-
ization structures. Under the diﬀerent structures, firm 2’s equilibrium output levels
(which are given in Lemma 2) are strictly positive for w0 < wD0 ≡ 5A/(5 + 2∆),
w0 < w
C
0 ≡ A/(1 +∆), and w0 < wU0 ≡ (2 + 5∆2 − 5∆)A/[2(1 +∆) (1−∆+∆2)] for
D, C and U, respectively. It is straightforward to check that w0(∆) < wU0 < w
C
0 < w
D
0 .
As condition (1) is the most restrictive one, it ensures that firm 2 has strictly positive
output levels under all unionization structures.
Proof of Proposition 2.
We can obtain firm 1’s equilibrium profits directly from Lemma 2 as Π1 = q21 must
hold in equilibrium. We have to compare Iρ = Πρ1(∆) − Π
ρ
1(0) with ρ = D,C,U . We
obtain
ID =
¡
280∆w0(A− w0) + 196∆2w20
¢
/2025, (5)
IC = ∆w0(A− w0(1−∆))/9, (6)
IU =
µ
(2 + 2∆2 +∆)A− 2w0(1− 2∆) (1−∆+∆2)
12 (1−∆+∆2)
¶2
−
µ
A− w0
6
¶2
. (7)
Let us first compare ID and IC. Using (5) and (6) yields that ID > IC if and only
if w0 < ew0 ≡ 55A/(55 + 29∆), which is implied by Assumption (1) since ew0 − w0 =
17
8A∆ 4∆+17
(55+29∆)(1−∆2) > 0. Secondly, to compare I
U and ID, let us define a ≡ (A− w0)/3,
b ≡ 2∆w0
3
+ A∆
2(1−∆+∆2) and c ≡ 7∆w0/15. Then, we can rewrite equations (7) and (5)
as IU = (8
9
a + 4
9
b) 9
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b and ID = (8
9
a + 4
9
c)c. Hence, for IU > ID it is suﬃcient to show
that 9b/16 > c, which reduces to w0 < 135A/ [64(1−∆+∆2)], which is implied by
Assumption 1. Hence, IU > ID and, therefore, IU > ID > IC .
Proof of Proposition 3.
We have to compare P ρ = Πρ1(∆) − Π
ρ
1(−∆) for ρ = D,C,U with “∆” indicating
that firm 1 holds the exclusive patent for the new technology and “−∆” indicating that
firm 2 holds the exclusive patent for the new technology. Let us first compare PD and
PC. We obtain PD = 4w0∆(2(A−w0)+w0∆)/45, and PC = w0∆(2(A−w0)+w0∆)/12,
so that PD > PC if w0 < 2A2−∆ which holds by Assumption 1.
Now let us turn to the comparison of PU and PD. Define a ≡ (A − w0)/3, b ≡
2∆w0/3+A∆/ [2(1−∆+∆2)], c ≡ 7∆w0/15, d ≡ 2∆w0/15 and e ≡ ∆w0/3+A∆(1−
∆)/ [2(1−∆+∆2)]. We can write the investment incentives under regimes U and D as
follows: PU = (2ab + b2 + 2ae − e2)/4 and PD = 4(2ac + c2 + 2ad − d2)/9. It follows
that PU > PD if and only if
a [2(b+ e)− 32(c+ d)/9] + b2 − e2 > 16(c2 − d2)/9.
For this condition to be satisfied, it is suﬃcient to show that the following two conditions
are jointly fulfilled:
2(b+ e) >
32
9
(c+ d), (8)
b2 − e2 > 16
9
(c2 − d2). (9)
Given that b+ e = ∆w0+
A∆(2−∆)
2(1−∆+∆2) and c+ d = 3∆w0/5, (8) holds for w0 <
15A(2−∆)
2(1−∆+∆2) ,
which is implied by Assumption 1. Turning now to requirement (9) note that
b2 − e2 = ∆
2
12
µ
4w20 + 4Aw0
1 +∆
1−∆+∆2 +
3A2∆(2−∆)
(1−∆+∆2)2
¶
and
c2 − d2 = (∆w0)2/5.
Hence, we know that (9) must be fulfilled if ∆2w0 [w0 +A(1 +∆)/(1−∆+∆2)] /3 >
16(∆w0)
2/45, which reduces to w0 <
5A(1+∆)
2(1−∆+∆2) , which again holds by Assumption 1.
Hence, PU > PD follows, and, therefore, PU > PD > PC.
Proof of Proposition 4.
An investment project I(∆) is undertaken under regime ρ (ρ = D,C,U) if and only
I ≤ Iρ. Due to Proposition 1, we can restrict the analysis to the three cases stated
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in the proposition. Regarding cases (i) and (iii) an investment project is undertaken
under every regime and under no regime, respectively. Consequently, it follows that the
wage-bill maximizing regime is C in case (i) and C or U in case (iii). We can thus restrict
attention to the remaining case (ii).
Using Lemma 1 and 2 we can write the industry wage bills under the unionization
structures as
UD(∆) = (100A(A− 2w0 + w0∆) + 100w20(1−∆) + 106w20∆2)/675,
UC(∆) = (A(A− w0(2−∆)) + w20(1−∆) + w20∆2)/6,
UU(∆) =
(A(2−∆)− 2w0(1−∆+∆2))2
24(1−∆+∆2) .
We first show that regime D is never optimal for workers. If a project I(∆) is not under-
taken under either D or C (i.e., I(∆) > ID), then C must be the wage-bill maximizing
regime. Secondly, if a project is undertaken under D (and, thereby, also under U), but
not under C (i.e., I(∆) > IC), comparison of UU and UD yields that UU(∆) > UD(∆)
if and only if
φ1(∆, w0)
120(1−∆+∆2) > 0 where
φ1(∆, w0) = 4w
2
0(5−2∆+3∆2+2∆3+∆4)−4Aw0(10−7∆+3∆3+7∆2)+5A2(4(1−∆)+∆2).
Calculating ∂φ1(∆, w0)/∂w0, we obtain that this is negative if w0 <
1
2
A(3∆+10)
5+3∆+∆2 , which
holds by Assumption 1. Using again Assumption 1 we set w0 =
(1−3∆)A
1−∆2 which we
substitute into φ1(∆, w0). This gives the expression (A∆)
2(133 − 172∆ + 222∆2 −
44∆3 + 5∆4)/ (1−∆2)2, which is strictly positive for all 0 < ∆ < 1/3. Hence, for case
(ii) only C and U can be optimal.
Comparing now the respective wage bills gives that UU(∆)− UC(0) is positive if
∆φ2(∆, w0)
24(1−∆+∆2) > 0, where (10)
φ2(∆, w0) = 4Aw0(1−∆+∆2)− 4w20(1− 2∆+ 2∆2 −∆3)− 3A2∆.
As the denominator of (10) is strictly positive, the sign of UU(∆) − UC(0) is given by
the sign of φ2(∆, w0). As this expression is quadratic in w0, we prove the existence of a
unique threshold e∆(w0) > 0 such that φ2(e∆(w0), w0) = 0 in an indirect way. Note that
this also implies φ2(∆, w0) > 0 for ∆ > e∆ and φ2(∆, w0) < 0 for ∆ < e∆. Solving the
19
quadratic form φ2(∆, w0) = 0 we obtain two critical values
w0,1 =
A
2
Ã
1−∆(1−∆)−
p
(1− 5∆+ 9∆2 − 8∆3 + 4∆4)
1− 2∆+∆2(2−∆)
!
, (11)
w0,2 =
A
2
Ã
1−∆(1−∆) +
p
(1− 5∆+ 9∆2 − 8∆3 + 4∆4)
1− 2∆+∆2(2−∆)
!
,
such that (10) holds if w0 < w0,1 or w0 > w0,2. Note, however, that w0,2 > w0(∆) for all
∆ ≥ 0. Hence, w0 > w0,2 can never hold. Now let us show that the term in brackets in
(11) is monotonically increasing in ∆. Calculating its derivative reveals that the sign of
the derivative is determined by the expression
1
2
[1 +∆− 12∆2 + 16∆3 − 8∆4] + 2Φ(1−∆+∆2)
(1−∆) [1− 2∆+ 2∆2 −∆3]Φ (12)
with Φ = (1− 2∆)
√
1−∆+∆2. We show that (12) is positive for all 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3.
Consider first the term in rectangular brackets of the nominator and define it by ζ(∆).
Calculating the second derivative yields ζ 00(∆) = −24(1 − 4∆(1 − ∆)). As ζ 00(∆) is
maximized at ∆ = 1/2, it is straightforward to check that ζ 00(∆) < 0 for all 0 ≤ ∆ <
1/3, which implies that ζ(∆) is strictly concave over this interval. Evaluating ζ(∆) at
the boundaries gives ζ(0) = 1 and ζ(1/3) = 40/81, so that ζ(∆) is strictly positive
over 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3. Next consider the second term in rectangular brackets of the
denominator which we define by φ(∆). The first and second derivative of this term are
φ0(∆) = −2 + 4∆ − 3∆2 and φ00(∆) = 2(2 − 3∆), respectively. It is immediate that
φ00(∆) is strictly positive over 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1/3. Evaluating φ0(∆) at the lower boundary
φ0(0) = −2 what implies that φ0(∆) is strictly decreasing over 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1/3. Evaluating
now φ(∆) at the upper boundary ∆ = 1/3 gives φ(1/3) = 14/27 which is positive.
Hence, φ(∆) is strictly positive over the interval 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3. As the other terms
of (12) are also positive we have shown that the threshold value w0,1 is monotonically
increasing in ∆. Moreover, for ∆ = 0 we obtain w0,1 = 0, and for ∆ = 1/3 we have
w0,1 =
27
28
A
¡
7
9
− 1
9
√
7
¢
> 0. Combining the values for w0,1 at the boundaries with the
monotonicity of w0,1 in∆ proves the existence of the unique threshold value 0 < e∆ < 1/3
for all 0 ≤ w0 ≤ A, and its monotonicity in w0 as stated in Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5.
We first derive the second-best investment incentives I∗ with perfectly competitive
labor markets. Then we prove the second part of the assertion which compares I∗ and
IU . Then we prove the first part of the proposition.
If the labor market is perfectly competitive, then the prevailing wage rate is w = w0.
Hence, firm 1’s equilibrium profits are Π1(w0,∆) = (A− w0(1− 2∆))2/9. Accordingly,
20
second-best investment incentives are defined by I∗ = Π1(w0,∆) − Π1(w0, 0) for which
we obtain I∗ = 4w0∆(A− w0(1−∆))/9. Comparing I∗ and IU we obtain
IU − I∗ = ∆ψ1(∆, w0)
48 (1−∆+∆2)2
, with (13)
ψ1(∆, w0) = A
2(4−∆+ 4∆2)− 4Aw0(5− 11∆+ 15∆2 − 10∆3 + 4∆4)
−8w20(6∆− 10∆2 + 10∆3 − 2− 6∆4 + 2∆5).
As the denominator is strictly positive the sign of IU − I∗ is positive if
ψ1(∆, w0) > 0. (14)
Condition (14) is quadratic in w0, which suggests an indirect way to prove the existence
of a unique threshold ∆∗(w0) > 0 such that ψ1(∆
∗(w0), w0) = 0. Note that this also
implies ψ1(∆, w0) > 0 for ∆ > ∆
∗ and ψ1(∆, w0) < 0 for ∆ < ∆
∗. Solving the quadratic
form we obtain two critical values
w0,1 =
A
8
Ã
5− 6∆+ 4∆2 −
p
(16∆4 − 32∆3 + 56∆2 − 40∆+ 9)
(1−∆) (1−∆+∆2)
!
, (15)
w0,2 =
A
8
Ã
5− 6∆+ 4∆2 +
p
(16∆4 − 32∆3 + 56∆2 − 40∆+ 9)
(1−∆) (1−∆+∆2)
!
,
such that (14) holds if w0 < w0,1 or w0 > w0,2. First note that w0,2 > w0(∆) for all
∆ ≥ 0, so that the second inequality never holds. We next show that the term in
brackets in (15) is monotonically increasing in ∆. Calculating its derivative reveals that
the sign of the derivative is determined by the expression£
2 + 48∆5 + 20∆− 112∆4 + 148∆3 − 99∆2 − 16∆6
¤
+Ψ(4− 12∆3 + 4∆4 + 19∆2 − 12∆),
(16)
with Ψ = (1− 2∆)
p
(4∆2 − 4∆+ 9). We show that expression (16) is strictly positive
for all 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3. Consider the first term in rectangular brackets which we denote by
ξ1. This term is strictly concave over 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3.21 Evaluating ξ1 at the boundaries
gives to positive values, so that ξ1 > 0 follows. As the remaining terms are also positive
over 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3 we can conclude that (16) is also positive, so that the threshold value
w0,1 is monotonically increasing in ∆. Moreover, for ∆ = 0 we obtain w0,1 = A/4 and
for ∆ = 1/3 the value w0,1 = 3A
¡
31−
√
73
¢
/112. Combining the values for w0,1 at
the boundaries with the monotonicity of w0,1 in ∆ proves the existence of the unique
21To see this, diﬀerentiate ξ1 successively with respect to ∆ and use the restriction 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3. It
then follows that ∂2ξ1/∂∆2 < 0 must hold.
21
threshold value 0 < ∆∗(w0) < 1/3 and its monotonicity in w0 for all A/4 < w0 < A as
asserted in the Proposition.
We finally show I∗ > ID holds for all 0 < ∆ < 1/3. First note that the diﬀerence
I∗ − ID is increasing in ∆, which follows form ∂(I∗ − ID)/∂∆ = w0(620(A − w0) +
1408w0∆)/2025 > 0. For ∆ = 0 we get I∗ − ID = 0, so that I∗ > ID holds for all
0 < ∆ < 1/3. By Proposition 2 it also follows that I∗ > IC.
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